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Setting the Sun on the British Empire:
British Economic Interests and the Decolonization of Hong
Kong
Abby Whitlock

Ruled under the Union Jack from 1841 to 1997, the British
acquired Hong Kong during the second wave of European
colonialism focused on Asia. Along with countries such as
Germany, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands, Britain looked for
new areas to provide support for mercantile capitalism and
manufacturing developments. Under Britain’s 154 years of rule, the
stable nature of British government systems and thorough economic
investments caused Hong Kong to become a wealthy international
trade center in the twentieth century. Despite these economic
investments and interests, the nature of the New Territories Lease
under which Britain acquired the totality of Hong Kong, which was
to expire in 1997, opened the question of who was to control Hong
Kong. The effect of the Cold War on Britain’s empire greatly
influenced Britain’s approach to the question of the colony’s future
sovereignty. With rapid decolonization and the rise of communism
in East Asia threatening Britain’s leading world role by the midtwentieth century, officials recognized the role Hong Kong played
in Britain’s economic policy, including with the potential of the
developing East Asian market. With this realization, Britain aimed
to protect these interests by preserving elements of Hong Kong’s
capitalist economic system during the decolonization negotiations
and resulting legislation in the 1980s. Although their approach to
Hong Kong’s decolonization aimed to safeguard British interests
and provide for a better relationship with China, the official
handover to the People’s Republic of China signaled the end of the
British Empire.
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British Economic Interests and the Acquisition of Hong Kong
The tension leading up to the Opium Wars spurred British
economic interests in the Hong Kong region. Ultimately, the First
Opium War began a chain reaction of European imperialist
domination over Qing China during the latter half of the nineteenth
century.1 By the mid-nineteenth century, British officials recognized
the market potential trade which China held, but China’s heavy
restrictions on trade with “barbarian” European countries were a
blow to the British economy. British importation of Chinese tea,
porcelain, spices, and silk under these heavy restrictions drained the
Treasury of gold and silver specie.2 In order to preserve economic
investments in the area, the British sought to gain freer access to the
Chinese market. At this time, Hong Kong was a base for British
traders, merchants, and, perhaps most importantly, opium dealers.
The opium trade expanded rapidly in the 1820s and 1830s after the
British gained Bengal in 1757. In order to balance Chinese imports,
British merchants sold opium in Chinese regions such as Hong
Kong.3 However, the opium trade was met with backlash from
Chinese officials, as the use of silver to pay for the drug and the
population’s increasing opium addiction undermined the Chinese
economy and national morale.4 In an attempt to combat the opium
trade, the Chinese increased measures against it, and Qing forces
began confiscating and destroying thousands of chests of British
opium. Queen Victoria responded by sending the first expeditionary
force to Hong Kong, starting the First Opium War in 1839.
British forces defeated the Qing forces and occupied Hong
Kong Island in 1841. The Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842 and
ratified in 1843, put an end to “consequent hostilities” between the
two countries. In the treaty, the Qing Emperor ceded Hong Kong
Island “in perpetuity” to Great Britain, allowing it to be governed by
British laws and regulations to govern it as a Crown Colony.5
Article III of the treaty catered to British economic interests in Hong
Kong, stating that “it being obviously necessary and desirable that
British subjects should have some port whereat they may careen and
refit their ships when required and keep stores for that purpose.”6
The British aims during the war were closely linked to their
economic interests and prospects in the region, including “the
opening of four or five Chinese ports to a freer British trade.”7
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/3
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Access to these ports in and around Hong Kong would give British
merchants not only a common place to dock, but also access to
established markets on the Chinese mainland. Through the cession
of territory in the treaty, British officials wanted to make Hong Kong
an area for cultural exchange and free trade between the Chinese and
British and with other European countries. In 1843, Governor John
Francis Davis described the prospects of Hong Kong stating that
There is a real British colony (no Portuguese
counterfeit) planted on the very threshold of China.
There they may see commerce flourishing in the
absence of restrictions, property and person secure
under the protection of equal laws, and, in a word, all
the best fruits of science and civilization transplanted
direct from the European headquarters. The good or
evil may do there will, by the law of inevitable
necessity, react upon ourselves.8
Britain’s desire to open the Chinese mainland markets led to
the Second Opium War in 1856. After the Chinese detained ships
protected under the British flag, British and French forces attacked
Chinese forces. The British sought to legalize the opium trade, open
more ores to European, specifically British, trade, and to establish
diplomatic representation in Beijing to aid in discussions of trade
and economic policy.9 After the European forces sacked Beijing in
1860, both sides agreed to the Convention of Peking, which ceded
the Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island “in perpetuity” to
Great Britain.10 Although a relatively small piece of land, the
Kowloon Peninsula proved to be strategically important, as it was
situated at the entrance to Hong Kong harbor. With the Convention
opening more ports to British trade, the acquisition of the Kowloon
Peninsula gave the British control of activities in Hong Kong
Island’s harbor.11
Britain acquired its third and final parcel of land in the Hong
Kong region in 1898. Despite obtaining the Kowloon Peninsula’s
strategic location in 1860, the British were concerned with defense
of their Hong Kong ports and looked to secure the area surrounding
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. The opportunity came after China
was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, in which
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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Britain demanded to lease the territory to Kowloon’s north and other
neighboring islands.12 Under the Second Convention of Peking,
Britain gained the aforementioned “New Territories” in a ninetynine year, rent-free lease valid until 30 June 1997.13 Other European
nations demanded territory from coastal China after their defeat, but
Great Britain gained the biggest and most strategically important
parcels of land through the convention. With future economic
developments and expansions in the region, the New Territories
provided most of the needed resources, including water, power
supplies, and space for manufacturing.14 Ultimately, the New
Territories became the spark making Britain’s economic goals
prosper.
British Economic Developments and the Role of the Cold War
in the Approach to the Hong Kong Question
Today, Hong Kong is one of the four Tiger economies along
with Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore due to rapid economic
growth and an increasing standard of living.15 Hong Kong is
considered to be one of the world’s most advanced financial,
trading, and transportation centers and is considered to be the bridge
between both China and the West and Asia and the rest of the
world.16 Since the 1980s, Hong Kong has ranked in top positions on
the World Competitiveness Report and in the Index of Economic
Freedom. Economists highlight its defining features as a free market
economy with private ownership, non-interventionism in economic
affairs on the part of the government, wealth used to develop a sound
welfare and social service system, expenditure reduction to below
twenty percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a fullybacked currency system pegged to the United States dollar, and
extensive foreign exchange reserves.17 According to former Hong
Kong Financial Secretary Donald Tsang, Britain’s economic
policies revolved primarily around seven different rules, including
the “living-within-our-means” rule; maintaining
adequate ate fiscal reserves; a low, simple, and
predictable tax system; a rigorous user-pays system
for fees and charges to underpin the low tax regime;
combating tax avoidance and tax evasion; providing
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/3
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tax concessions where most needed; and avoiding
fueling inflation.18
Although these factors define Hong Kong’s presence on the
world stage today as a strong capitalist economy, Hong Kong’s
rapid economic growth has roots in the years after the Second World
War. The Second World War was a major blow to British control of
Hong Kong, as Japan occupied the colony from December 1941 to
September 1945. Despite tensions over the question of Hong Kong,
China and Britain were allies during World War II. However, in
1942, Britain rejected Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek’s request
for the return of Hong Kong. Britain said that any negotiations over
Hong Kong would only come as a part of a general settlement with
its other Asian colonies. China’s demand for Hong Kong was
supported by American President Franklin Roosevelt, who stated
that under the Atlantic Charter of 1943, all peoples living under
colonial rule were to have their “sovereign rights and selfgovernment restored.”19 Britain refused once more, but promised
they would reconsider the question once the war was over. However,
Hong Kong was not included in China’s territories gained as a victor
in the war, instead getting Taiwan, which had been under Japanese
rule since 1895.20 With the rise of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) in 1949, the debate over the Hong Kong question increased
as ideological differences between interested parties increasingly
diverged.
British Cold War Interests in Hong Kong
For the British, their approach to Hong Kong was influenced
by three primary factors: the rise of Chinese communism and
nationalism, the expansion of economic developments in Hong
Kong, and the decolonization of British holdings. With a rapidly
decreasing colonial presence and the rising threat of communism
and nationalism, Britain attempted to resuscitate its diminishing
power on the world stage and in East Asia by developing a sound
capitalist economic system in Hong Kong. As of 1949, the Colonial
Office stated that the amount of British capital invested in Hong
Kong was around £156 million, emphasizing the potential Hong
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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Kong held for further expansion and how it benefited Britain’s
empire as a whole.21
The rise of Chinese communism and nationalism was a
central threat in the minds of British officials after World War II. In
1946, the British Foreign and Colonial Offices created a joint
memorandum about the future of Hong Kong and outlined the
different perspectives regarding how to approach the question of
Hong Kong’s sovereignty. In the opening paragraph, the
memorandum recognizes the initial importance of the New
Territories Lease as a means of solidifying “proper defence and
protection of the colony,” but emphasizes that after the war,
preserving the lease would be beneficial in creating stronger
“economic intercommunication” in the colony.22 The question of
whether or not Britain should take the initiative in negotiations about
Hong Kong was greatly influenced by the increase of Chinese
nationalism associated with the rise of the CCP. For the British, the
rise of nationalism in China meant the increased danger that Hong
Kong would fall victim to Chinese propaganda. Internationally, the
British feared the Chinese government would consequently request
the full return of the colony to Chinese sovereignty, leaving the
British with decreased influence and control of the region. With
their long-term goal of “freedom of commercial opportunity in
China and the Far East”, the rise of the CCP could limit Britain’s
expansion from Hong Kong to other markets in East Asia.23 After
the Second World War, the economy of Hong Kong relied on
entrepôt trade and the distribution of products, as the British had not
yet invested in the manufacturing and service sectors that would
define Hong Kong’s economy in from the 1960s onward.24
Although well underway in the shift to a manufacturing economy,
China’s nationalist claims to Hong Kong could damage the use of
the colony as a base for British trade and expansion. Prior to the
rapid decolonization of British holdings in the region, Hong Kong
was Britain’s main territory facilitating trade with its other Asian
colonies, such as Malaysia.25
Rapid decolonization after the Second World War greatly
influenced Britain’s approach to the Hong Kong question during the
Cold War. Prior to the Second World War, Britain had conquered
territories in most parts of the world, including Borneo, Burma,
India, Ceylon, and Malaya in Asia.26 These Asian colonies were
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/3
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essential to Britain, as they not only provided resources for the
mother country, but they also provided Britain with access to the
various Asian markets. In Asian colonies such as Hong Kong and
Singapore, the colonies had the bonus of providing Britain with
naval bases for the Royal Navy, Britain’s other prime method of
maintaining world power. Both World Wars left Britain extremely
weak and unable to invest as many resources into its imperial
holdings. Combined with the colonies’ contributions of troops and
resources to the British war effort, Britain’s overseas colonies
experienced several nationalist and independence movements that
resulted in decolonization in many parts of the empire, particularly
Africa and Asia. As its number of colonies decreased, Britain’s grip
on world power waned. With the Cold War, a new world order
emerged, with the United States and the Soviet Union taking the
helm of the bi-polar conflict. Since it started its colonization process,
Britain had always considered its colonies to be significant to its
presence on the world stage, with economic and political control
over various colonies providing Britain with the wealth and
resources it needed to be a leading player in world politics.
However, losing colonies such as India immediately after World
War Two meant that Britain lacked the needed resources to maintain
its status as a major player. It could fall to become a second-rate
player behind the United States and the Soviet Union.27 With Hong
Kong as one of its last major holdings in East Asia, Britain feared
that losing Hong Kong would set a precedent for future claims to
independence by its remaining colonial holdings.28
The fears outlined in the 1946 Joint Memorandum set the
stage for Britain’s approach to Hong Kong from the 1950s to the
early 1980s. Recognizing the weakness of Hong Kong’s entrepôt
trade-focused economy, Britain sought to expand its industrial
capacity in the early 1950s. Britain’s expansion plan included the
introduction of industrial plants combined with increased export of
these manufactured goods. Under this plan, Hong Kong would no
longer rely simply on distributing imports and exports coming
through Hong Kong’s ports, but would also create a new opportunity
for increased investment. With an increased industrial capacity,
Britain had more control over the amount of capital invested in the
process and also controlled the amount of revenue earned from the
various manufacturing plants. This control over the manufacturing
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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process and the types of goods allowed Britain to tailor its
production to suit the most valuable goods circulating in the world
market. They could also identify the types of goods missing from
the market, produce them in a streamlined, cost-efficient manner,
and introduce them to the market to make more revenue by filling a
void. This flexible approach to manufacturing allowed Hong Kong
to expand beyond the immediate East Asian market and its
connection with Britain, with Hong Kong establishing trade ties
with the United States, one of the biggest economies in the world
during the 1960s and to the present day.29 By 1966, a year where the
GDP per capita was $4,776 million and exports were around $5,729
million, textiles accounted for fifty-two percent of domestically
produced products.30
In the 1970s and the early 1980s, Britain shifted to
incorporate the financial sector into Hong Kong’s economy. This
included the establishment of large insurance companies and
twenty-four-hour banks focused on supporting international trade
and foreign investment. With foreign trade supported by Hong
Kong’s ports, foreign banks also expanded their overseas operations
to include branches in the colony.31 This combination of the
financial sector and the manufacturing plants caused economic
growth to increase rapidly, with the GDP continuing to rise, exports
increasing in value, and the unemployment rate to decrease.
Economists call Britain’s approach to capitalist economic expansion
in this time “consensus capitalism,” which viewed maximizing
economic opportunity as a defense of “political liberty” and
encouraging an “equality of opportunity” for all.32 Financial
Secretary Sir Hamish Macleod justified Britain’s “consensus
capitalist” investments by saying
[there is] a consensus about the need to encourage
free enterprise and competition, while promoting
equity and assistance for those who need it.
Enterprise, because that is what gives dynamism to
our economy. Equity, because the community rightly
expects a fair deal for everyone, and in particular that
raw competition be tempered by help for those less
able to compete.33
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/3
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For Britain, these economic developments were an attempt
to safeguard British economic interests and their waning influence
in the East Asian region. Facing rapid decolonization and the threat
of Chinese nationalism, economic expansion was the most
reasonable and cost-efficient way to maintain control over Hong
Kong. Despite these economic developments reflecting Britain’s
strong influence in the colony, Britain had another hurdle to face by
the 1980s: the 1997 expiration of the New Territories Lease.
Keeping in mind the impact of these economic developments and
their connection to future market interests, Britain turned its
attention to leveraging these factors into negotiation talks over the
sovereignty of Hong Kong.
The Long 1980s: Sino-British Negotiations and Basic Law
With the 1997 expiration date of the New Territories Lease
approaching, negotiations about the future of Hong Kong’s
sovereignty began to take shape. Proper negotiations about Hong
Kong did not occur before the 1980s, despite Mao Zedong’s repeal
of the Nationalist government’s approach, instead focusing on
discussing the question when conditions were “ripe.”34 It was not
until Deng Xiaoping became Chairman after Mao’s death in 1976
that China’s government shifted policies to favor negotiations about
Hong Kong. As a part of its modernization policy, the government
approved a three-point policy toward the Hong Kong question in
1981 that focused on acquiring sovereignty over Hong Kong in a
way that would allow the region to service China’s economic and
political strategies.35 With this in mind, Deng implemented the
concept of “one country, two systems”. Initially meant to apply to
Taiwan and Macao, the concept revolved around “one China”, but
with distinct Chinese regions with their own economic and
administrative systems, while the rest of the PRC used communism
with Chinese characteristics.36 In a 1984 Beijing Review, officials
wrote that
[A]utonomy will be achieved under the unified state
sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. The
concept of ‘one country, two systems’ should never
be understood as ‘two sovereigns in one country’ or
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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‘two mutually exclusive political entities in one
country,’ as some people have claimed. Our aim is to
consolidate the unification of the nation, not its
permanent separation.37
For the Chinese government, this unification could be
achieved by creating special administrative regions, which would,
ideally, coincide with the autonomy wishes of both the government
and the nation in which negotiations over territory were being held.
Incorporating this idea into legislation, Article 31 of the PRC’s
Constitution stated that “the state may establish special
administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted
in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted
by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific
conditions”.38
With China more open to approaching the Hong Kong
question, the stage was set for the initial negotiations about
sovereignty after 1997. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s
September 1982 visit to Beijing was seen as a step toward amiable
negotiations, as it was the first visit by an incumbent prime minister
to the PRC. However, Thatcher, in the wake of British victory in the
Falklands, insisted that despite Chinese perspective of the
Convention of Peking and Treaty of Nanking as “unequal”, the
treaties were “valid in international law”.39 After hearing that the
British wanted to retain sovereignty over Hong Kong, China took a
hard stance and insisted that their sovereignty over the colony was
not negotiable. The deadlock in negotiations sparked a currency
crisis, as the Hong Kong dollar (approximately $1 USD to $7.8
HKD) dropped twenty percent in just over a week. After pegging
the HKD to the United States Dollar to avoid a further crisis, British
officials realized that in order to progress negotiations, they had to
change their goal for Hong Kong’s future.40
Despite tense negotiations, officials on both sides realized
the two countries held some common ground. Despite individual
differences on both sides, the general consensus was that both China
and Great Britain wanted to develop amiable relations with one
another. For China, this was a recent development stemming from
Deng’s modernization policies. In the early 1980s, Beijing felt as if
it was time for China to emphasize a more independent yet neutral
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/3
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image from its early Cold War actions of associating itself with the
United States. As the threat of the Soviet Union declined, China
viewed economic relations as key to their modernization plans,
especially after Deng introduced a free-market economy. This
economic modernization included strengthening relations with the
West, particularly with Britain and the European Community. As
one of the leading figures in the European market, China viewed
developing relations with Britain as a step toward creating a link
with the West as a whole.41
Britain’s interests were extremely similar. Despite making
expansive developments through Hong Kong’s economic system,
the British sought to have both another outlet and trading partner for
their Hong Kong investments. They also sought another market to
invest in themselves. Although communism was an initial concern,
this shifted to focus primarily on the Soviet Union’s influence after
Deng implemented his modernization policies. British and Chinese
interests first converged in this desire to counter Soviet influence in
East Asia in order to safeguard their interests. These interests later
converged again when Thatcher encouraged economic relations in
East Asia and the Pacific, particularly the new industrializing
countries of Taiwan, Singapore, and Taiwan, three of the future
Tiger Economies. Britain recognized that Deng’s modernization
policies made China an important economic player in the East Asian
market. Rather than compete with them for influence in the region,
officials aimed to create a better Sino-British relationship not only
to benefit Britain’s activities in the East Asian market as a whole,
but also to protect their investments in Hong Kong post-1997. 42
Through their negotiations about Hong Kong’s sovereignty, both
China and Great Britain were shaping their future relationships with
each other.43 Recognizing this commonality in market expansions
and investments, Britain softened its line on sovereignty and instead
focused on Hong Kong’s economic system.
In 1984’s final round of negotiations, Britain focused on
preserving Hong Kong’s existing economic and administrative
system after the transfer of sovereignty. They channeled this focus
into the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which reflected the common
interests of both countries in creating a sound relationship with each
other. The declaration worked toward “strengthening and
development of the relations between the two countries on a new
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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basis” through the "maintenance of the prosperity and stability of
Hong Kong”.44 The main provision of the treaty was that the PRC
could not practice its socialist system in Hong Kong, thereby
protecting the system of “private property, ownership of enterprises,
legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be
protected by law”.45 Even though many articles state that Hong
Kong would continue to support foreign investments and exchanges,
one article explicitly illustrates both Britain and China’s wishes
coming in to the final round of negotiations. Article 9 states, “the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually
beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other
countries.”46 Although it caters to China’s modernization goal of
establishing links with the West, Article 9 overwhelmingly reflects
Britain’s aim to maintain ties with Hong Kong for economic
relations as a means of having some form of control in the region.
As Hong Kong was encouraged to create economic relations with
other countries, Britain could then use their ties with the former
colony to create new links with other markets in East Asia. The Joint
Declaration was signed on 19 December 1984 by PRC Premier Zhao
Ziyang and Prime Minister Thatcher and was effective on 1 July
1997 with the expiration of the 1898 New Territories Lease.
The Joint Declaration promised to implement these
agreements into Basic Law, the constitutional document for the
future HKSAR drafted between 1985 and 1990. Following Article
31 of the PRC Constitution, Basic Law established the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) on the basis of the Joint
Declaration.47 Central to its foundation, a stipulation from the 1980s
negotiations was that the PRC had to agree to the “One Country,
Two Systems” policies they discussed as integral to their
modernization policies. Chinese officials pledged in Article 5 that
these economic policies would remain unchanged for fifty years
until 30 June 2047:
The socialist system and policies shall not be
practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, and the previous capitalist system and way
of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.48
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By preserving the capitalist status quo and affording the
region a “high degree of autonomy,” Hong Kong could maintain its
status as an international financial center, a free port, center of free
trade, and a separate custom territory. Despite the transfer of
sovereignty, Britain ultimately benefited from the Joint Declaration
and its translation into Basic Law, as their economic developments
and future interests were maintained. Although their presence and
control ended with the effective date of the Joint Declaration,
Britain’s influence found new residence through Hong Kong’s
preserved capitalist system and access to economic markets in the
region. Regards of having to share this region with China, Britain’s
interests managed to survive decolonization, albeit in a more limited
form.
Conclusion: Decolonization and the Future of Hong Kong
On 1 July 1997, Britain officially transferred sovereignty of
Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. Ceremonial events
ran from 30 June to 1 July and included PRC President Jiang Zemin,
Prince Charles, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Governor Chris
Patten. Key images from the handover include lowering of the
Union Jack to the tune of “God Save the Queen”, and the departure
of the HMY Britannia from the former headquarters of British
Forces Overseas Hong Kong. Although the nature of the handover
was one of happiness and successful prospects for Hong Kong, the
former colony’s future is still unsure. The Sino-British Joint
Declaration is set to expire in 2047, meaning that the “one country,
two systems” agreement essentially protecting Hong Kong’s
capitalist system from socialism is no longer valid. With 2047
approaching, officials and economists try to predict what Hong
Kong’s future may be at the hands of the PRC. Prospects for the
future are divided into three major paths, none of which involve full
Hong Kong independence: China extends the current autonomy as
an SAR with Basic Law preserving the capitalist system; China will
revoke Hong Kong’s status as an SAR and it will become a normal
province with no autonomy; or China will take more middle-of-theroad approach, with some autonomy privileges preserved and some
that are not.
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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This uncertain timeline puts the existence of British
economic investments in Hong Kong in jeopardy. For Britain, these
economic investments represented an attempt to preserve its place
on the world stage. “The Pearl of the East’s” world presence as an
international finance center and leading market economy reflected
the pinnacle of capitalist achievement that Britain aimed to be
known for, as it was a part of its identity as a world leader.49
Simultaneously, these capitalist characteristics not only reflected, in
Britain’s eyes, their successful influence in the region, but also
provided an outlet for Britain’s interests and investments in a time
when its identity was uncertain. Britain recognized that the Cold
War, particularly with the rapid decolonization of their colonies in
Africa and Asia and the rise of Chinese communism and
nationalism, greatly threatened its grip on global power. Realizing
that retaining sovereignty over the region was impossible, Britain
looked to preserve its economic benefits and potential for future
prospects in the region. Although the Sino-British Joint Declaration
forced Britain to relinquish sovereignty over Hong Kong, the
resulting Basic Law attempted to safeguard British interests and
investments in the region through the preservation of the capitalist
economic system that they had developed over decades.
With the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army and the
lowering of the Union Jack in 1997, the handover not only ended
the British presence in Hong Kong, but also brought an end to
British colonialism in East Asia and to the British Empire as a
whole. Although Britain still retains control over some overseas
territories, losing full control of Hong Kong signaled the end of
Britain’s role as a major world power. For nearly four hundred years,
Britain’s political control of and economic investment in various
colonies helped build their presence as a world leader. As its last
major colonial holding, transferring Hong Kong to China illustrated
the end of one era of the world order and the dawn of a new world
order in which Britain would once again have to carve out its place.
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